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1 1 MARKET VALUE IMPACT OF JOINT VENTURES:





Previous studies of the market value impact of announcements of
joint ventures have not considered industry effects. We suggest that the
impact of such announcements varies with the inform at ion-process-
ing load associated with analyzing events in lhe relevant industrj'. An
event study analysis hased on a stratified sample of 108 announce-
ments in three industry groups, one with a light, one with a moder-
ate. and one with a heavy information-processing load, ronfirmed this
hypothesis. We examine implications for a signaling perspective on
joint venture announcements.
Joint ventures are collaborative interfirm arrangements involving either
equity participation by the partners in a new entity, one firm's taking an eq-
uity pOsSition in another, or joint ongoing manufacturing or marketing activity
(cf. Harrigan, 1985). A growing number of researchers have studied sever-
al aspects of joint ventures, including motives (Oliver, 1990), benefits (Har-
rigan. 1985), interpartner learning (Hamel, 1991), and effects on stock val-
ue (e.g., Koh & Venkatraman, 1991). By isolating the abnormal stockholder
retiums attributable to the announcements of joint ventures, researchers in
the last stream have established that such announcements affect the mar-
ket value of venture participants positively [Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; Mc-
Connell & Nantell, 1985). We sought to extend tbis line of inquiry by ex-
ploring whether the market value impact of joint venture announcements
varies across industries. Even though it is widely accepted that environments
moderate the strategy-performance relationship (Prescott, 1986) and tbat re-
searchers investigating strategy need to control for industry effects (Dess, Ire-
land, & Hitt, 1990), previous studies bave not considered the effects of in-
dustry on the market value impact of joint venture announcements. We sug-
gest that the market impact varies with the information-processing load faced
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by investors seeking to analyze relevant industry events. Specifically, we hy-
potliesized that a U-shaped relationship exists between the degree of in-
formation processing required for an investment analyst to understand a
joint venture and tbe venture's perceived market value. Thus, this article
contributes to tbe literature by incorporating a cognitive perspective into tbe
study of the market value impact of joint ventures.
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR POSITIVE MARKET VALUE IMPACT
The reasoning that the benefits of joint ventures outweigh their costs
is the premise for arguing that the announcement of a joint venture should
increase the market value of tbe participating firms. If a joint venture does,
in fact, hold the promise of strengthening a firm's strategic prospects, in-
vestors should view the firm's future performance in a positive manner.
Given the assumption of an efficient capital market (Fama. 1976)—the
premise tbat security prices reflect all available information—there must
be a consequent positive impact on the stock price of the firm. This im-
pact will be demonstrated by stockholder wealth creation through abnor-
mal positive returns associated with the announcement of joint ventures.
This reasoning is embodied in tbe event study approach that has been used
to evaluate the stock market impact of joint ventures. Two points must he
noted regarding this approach: First, a key issue in the stockholder wealtb
creation process, and one that is central to this study, is how the cogni-
tive processes of investors affect their use of available information in
evaluating joint venture announcements. For example, if investors face a
very large amount of information, do they react in the same way as when
there is a small or moderate amount of information? In other words, is tbe
assumption of an efficient capital market valid in all situations? Second,
several authors bave discussed the limitations of the event study approach
(see the Methods section) in the context of organizational research. How-
ever, given that most firms need to tap the market for funds, the invest-
ment community is a key stakeholder that both directly and indirectly in-
fluences managers' decision making, firms' incentive structures and de-
signs, and the relationships among resource allocation decisions.
In their empirical investigation of tbe common stock returns of U.S.
firms that participated in domestic joint ventures, McConnell and Nantell
(1985) concluded tbat significant stockholder wealth gains resulted from
joint venture announcements. From data on a sample of 136 joint ventures
involving 210 firms from diverse industries, they inferred that joint ven-
ture announcements were, in fact, wealth-creating transactions for the
shareholders of the participating firms.
More recently. Koh and Venkatraman (1991) examined the market
value impact of joint venture formation in the information technology sec-
tor. Their sample consisted of 239 firms involved in 175 joint ventxires over
the period 1972-86. Joint ventures were sbown to have a greater impact
than technology exchanges, whereas licensing, marketing, and supply
agreements did not have any significant impact. Furtber, joint ventures had
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significant, positive effects if they strengthened existing product-market
segments or placed new products in existing markets, but not if they de-
veloped new customers or entered new, unrelated product-market seg-
ments. Finally, it was found that the relative sizes of the partner firms were
key to the extent of market value impact: shareholders of the smaller part-
ners earned significantly positive abnormal returns, but tliose of the laig-
er partners earned insignificant abnormal returns.
THE EFFECT OF INDUSTRY INFORMATION-PROCESSING LOAD
Dess and colleagues {1990) noted that strategic management re-
searchers have not consistently controlled for possible industry effects.
Further, they suggested that researchers can gain additional understand-
ing and insight regarding empirical results, as well as help in developing
more accurate normative and descriptive theories, by including industry
controls in their studies. Some studies have incorporated the effect of in-
dustry on joint venture formation and characteristics (e.g., Harrigan,
1988a), but research related to the market value impact of joint ventures
has rested on the assumption that impact is invariant across industries. For
instance, despite employing a muitiindustry sample, McConnell and Nan-
tell (1985) did not control for industry. By focusing on one sector of the
economy, information technology, Koh and Venkatraman (1991) reduced
the effect of environmental variation on their results. However, their def-
inition of information technology was rather broad, including industries
as diverse as electronic components, TV programming, and software.
As noted, we propose that the information-processing load associat-
ed with an industry significantly influences the way in which a market an-
alyst reads and responds to joint venture announcements. The analysis-
decision-action cycle can be descrihed as follows: an analyst views a re-
port, evaluates the information, decides if the implications are positive or
negative, and accordingly buys, holds, or sells the relevant stock, therehy
influencing its price. Quite clearly, the analyst's cognitive processes and
limitations play a crucial role in this cycle. In assuming that stock prices
reflect all available information, however, users of the event study method
have neglected to take those cognitive elements into account. The present
study is in accord with recent strategic management research, which holds
that cognition plays a major role in strategic decisions (Eisenhardt &
Zharacki. 1992).
Industry Information-Processing Load
Building on the literature related to information-processing load (Dun-
bar. 1981; Reger & Huff, 1993), we posit the construct of industry infor-
mation-processing load. The information-processing load associated with
an industry will depend on the "multiplexity" of information—the pres-
ence of simultaneous signals that compete for attention—in the industry's
environment and will determine the difficulty of analyzing the competi-
tive impact of an industry event. Investors will find it easier to assess the
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consequences of an event when there is low information load because the
cause and effect relationships among critical success factors can he more
easily determined. Although it might seem that increasing levels of in-
formation will he associated with increasing formality of analysis, cogni-
tive psychologists have concluded that the amount of information
processed under varying information-processing loads actually follows an
inverted U-shaped curve (Taylor, 1984). When the information-processing
load is light, decision makers process low amounts of information; when
it is moderate, they process the highest amount of information; and when
the information-processing load is heavy, they exhihit signs of cognitive
strain (Taylor, 1984) and revert to processing low amounts of information.
This finding has heen reinforced in a variety of decision settings (e.g,,
Eisenhardt & Zharacki, 1992).
Miller's (1956) finding that people cannot hold more than about sev-
en "chunks" of information in their minds at a time forms the hasis for the
construct of information-processing load. Simon (1957) carried this argu-
ment further hy suggesting that the human mind can deal with only a lim-
ited amount of information in any given period of time. This cognitive lim-
it leads to information overload on the part of a decision maker (Dunhar,
1981; Reger & Huff, 1993). The information-processing load associated with
a situation is a good indicator of the kind of analysis that would he undertaken
in that situation (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki. 1992). Weick (1970) suggested that
people respond to information overload hy employing "disengaging" strate-
gies that help to balance perceived information-processing demands with
perceived information-processing capahilities. For example, one disen-
gaging strategy might be to emphasize past, rather than ctirrent, informa-
tion-processing demands by focusing on completing ongoing projects
(Dunhar, 1981; Weick, 1970). Similarly, Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
demonstrated that people rely on decision heuristics to reduce complex
tasks to simpler judgmental operations. It has heen repeatedly ohserved
that people respond to highly complex and uncertain situations hy at-
tempting to simplify them (Reger & Huff, 1993). For lighter information-
processing loads, causal linkages and meaus-ends relations are clear, and
extensive analysis may not he necessary—choices can be effectively made
through the application of principles (Ghemawat, 1991). As the informa-
tion-processing load increases, decision makers increasingly turn to more
formal and sophisticated analyses (Flynn, 1990). Thus, large, integrated
databases and analytical systems will be relied upon in environments in
which uncertainty is at a moderate level (Fredrickson, 1984). However, he-
yond some threshold, formal approaches hegin to lose their utility, and de-
cision makers rely more on informal discussions, patterns of past experi-
ence, and decision heuristics (Flynn. 1990; Tversky & Kahneman. 1974).
We propose that the general notion of information-processing load can
he meaningfully applied to industries. The information-processing load as-
sociated with an industry reflects the quantity and nature of relevant in-
formation and determines the difficulty of analyzing the competitive im-
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pact of an industry event. Industry information-processing load is hy-
pothesized to influence investor response to joint venture announcements
as follows: If investors like what they see in proposed arrangements, they
will buy or recommend the .stock of the partner firms, thereby driving
prices up and creating shareholder wealth. The core of our argument is that
the investment community's ability to clearly perceive the potential ben-
efits of a joint venture is a key element in this process. If joint ventures
are beneficial in general, investors' ability to perceive the potential bene-
fits of a particular joint venture will depend on the information-process-
ing load in the relevant industry. The result may be that the venture's ben-
efits, though potentially present, are not sufficiently clear to justify an en-
thusiastic response. In industries with light information-processing loads,
investors will find it relatively easy to anticipate a joint venture's impact
and will respond positively. In industries with moderate loads, investors
will attempt to formally assess a venture's potential impact, and the in-
herent difficulty of the formal analysis will dampen immediate investor
response. Finally, in industries with heavy information-processing loads,
it may be so difficult to assess potential benefits analytically that in-
vestors will use simplifying assumptions ("joint ventures are bound to be
helpful") and respond positively. Thus,
Hypotbesis 1: Tbe abnormal stock market returns asso-
ciated witb joint venture announcements in industries
witb ligbt and beavy information-processing loads will
be more positive tban tbe abnormal returns associated
witb joint venture announcements in industries witb
moderate information-processing loads,
METHODS
The standard event study methodology was used to measure the
strength of investor response to joint venture announcements. This method
has been widely used both in research on finance (e.g., McConnell & Nan-
tell, 1985) and research on strategy (e.g., Davidson & Worrell, 1992). The
method has its limitations (Bromiley, Govekar, & Marcus. 1989), especially
regarding departures from the capital market efficiency assumption, such
as overreaction to events and size effects. Further, it has been criticized
as being inappropriate for evaluating incremental change, anticipated
change, and the impact of past events (Bromiley et al, 1989). However, the
event study method provided us with a weil-accepted way of testing dif-
ferences in investor response to joint ventures across industries; the as-
sumption that stock market reaction presages the actual success or failure
of a joint venture was not necessary. We summarize the method here: a de-
tailed exposition can be found in Dodd and Warner (1983). Event study
employs a market model to estimate the abnormal returns accruing to a
shareholder consequent upon a specified event. Daily market model pa-
rameters are estimated for a firm using 45 days' returns, from 60 days be-
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fore the event (( - 60) to 15 days before it (/ - 15), and the formula /?.,. =
^i '̂ _ Mmt + ^' where H.,. is the expected stock return of firm / on day t,
i?^, is the rate of return on a value-weighted index on day t, a- and b. are
ordinary-least-squares estimates of market model parameters, and e is' the
error term. The 45-day period over which the parameters are estimated is
referred to as the estimation period.
The abnormal return is the difference between the actual return dur-
ing tlie event period and the return predicted using the market model.
Thus. /?,, = /?.,. + PE, where B.^ is the actual return during the event peri-
od and PE is the prediction error, which is assumed to represent the mar-
ket value impact ofthe announcement. We used the test statistics descrihed
in Dodd and Warner (1983) to determine if the prediction error was sig-
nificantly different from zero.
A key issue in the event study method is the choice of the event pe-
riod, an issue that has been extensively discussed (Bromiley et al., 1989;
Lubatkin & vShrieves, 1986). The event period, or announcement period!
is the period over which the impact of the announcement on the securi-
ty's price is measured. Many authors have used a two-day period consisting
ofthe day prior to an announcement and the announcement day itself. Tak-
ing a conservative approach that accounts for possihle information leak-
age before, during, and after the formal announcement of an event as well
as for delays in processing information, we examined the market response
over several time frames, including the standard two-day window.
Design
In considering different methods of controlling for industry effects,
Dess and colleagues (1990) suggested tbat stratified sampling by industry
is generally appropriate to the complex nature of strategic management re-
search. As this suggestion was relevant to oiu- hypothesis, we adopted a
stratified sampling design in whicb we chose six industry samples, two
characterized by light information-processing loads, two by moderate
loads, and two by heavy loads.
Indicator of Industry Information-Processing Load
Industry information-processing load was measured as the standard
deviation among earnings forecasts made by institutional brokers (O'Brien,
1990). These brokers and other analysts publish their estimates of how ma-
jor firms will perform at the end of a given quarter. The brokers' estimates
are available In the I/B/E/S data bank (Institutional Brokers Estimate Sys-
tem, 1992). Typically, a number of earnings forecasts will be available for
each firm in each quarter, with each forecast coming from a different an-
alyst. We argue that the standard deviation among the earnings forecasts
made by analysts can be averaged over the firms in an industry to yield a
proxy for industry information-processing load. Previous research has
shown that analysts do not vary significantly from each other in ex post
forecast accuracy (O'Brien, 1990). Tbus, there is no reason to believe that
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a high standard deviation among analysts' forecasts can be attributed to
individual differences. Further, we can safely conclude tbat the analysts
represented in the 1/B/E/S data are experts on their own industries and that
they are, by and large, equally well-informed on the latest developments
in the industry they analyze. It has been sbown, however, that the diver-
sity of analysts' options increases as private information increases (Barry
& Jennings. 1992). Thus, an industry in which the estimates diverge less
from each other ought to be characterized by reasonahly equal access to
public information and a ligbter information-processing load. Similarly,
estimates relating to a heavy information-processing-load industry can be
expected to diverge more—thus leading to a high standard deviation. We
averaged the reported standard deviations over an industry's firms over
1976-91 to arrive at the industry standard deviation. The 268 industries
in the database were then sorted in ascending order of these standard de-
viations, allowing us to identify industries with light, moderate, and heavy
information-processing loads.
The standard deviation of earnings forecasts ranged from 0.06 to 3.6,
with a mean value of 0.72 and a standard deviation of 0.38. We chose 0.53
as the cutoff for light information-processing load (mean minus half stan-
dard deviation) and 0.91 as the cutoff for heavy information-processing
load (mean plus half standard deviation). Visual inspection of the data in-
dicated that these levels offered good breaks, with tbe low and high areas
being sufficiently different from the mean but not so far away as to be vir-
tual outliers. Having sorted tbe industries into three groups, we random-
ly selected the six industries included in the analysis within the con-
straints of two criteria: (1) they should be declining or maturing (see tbe
section on controls below) and (2) tbere should be a reasonable probabil-
ity of our finding a sufficient number of joint ventures to satisfy the re-
quirements of the event study method. For example, we did not consider
sbipbuilding or the tobacco industry because it was unlikely we would
find enough joint ventures. Further, the oil industry, in which most pro-
jects are undertaken as joint ventures, was screened out. because investors
might not respond to sucb frequent ventures in the same way they would
respond in industries in which they are more infrequent. The sampled in-
dustries were as follows: machinery (general and industrial) and retail sales
in tbe light information-processing-load category, both having a standard
deviation of earnings forecasts of 0.51; tbe automobile and computer
(mainframe and minicomputer) industries in the moderate category, with
standard deviations of 0.82 and 0.77. respectively; and, the aluminum and
steel industries in the heavy information-processing-load category, with
standard deviations of earnings forecasts of 1.86 and 1.18. respectively.
Since information-processing load is associated with the amount and
variety of material (Smith & Grimm, 1991) and not simply with the un-
certainty that an investor needs to deal with, we developed three proxies
for industry information-processing load. The first is the number of reports
indexed to each of the six Industries in the Dow Jones News Retrieval Ser-
vice over 1989-94, divided by the number of establishments in that in-
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dustry reported in the 1991 Statistical Abstract of the United States and
in the 1992 Manufacturing USA. The Spearman rank-order correlation for
tlie six industries using the I/B/E/S~based measure and the first proxy was
0.93. The second proxy measin-ed size, which has been shown to he related
to complexity and thus information-processing demands (Baker & Cullen,
1993). For each industry, we calculated the ratio of number of employees
to number of establishments, using data drawn from the same volumes of
the Statistical Abstract and Manufacturing USA, as a normalized measure
of size. The Spearman rank-order correlation for the six industries using
the I/B/E/S-based measure and the second proxy was 0.93. For the third
proxy, our logic was as follows: industries that receive inputs and send out-
puts to few other industries are more self-contained and likely to be ver-
tically integrated (Maddigan, 1981), and high levels of vertical integration
will be associated with high levels of information processing. Thus, the
more industries with which a focal industry has dealings, the lighter its
information-processing load should be. We counted the number of indus-
tries from which each of our focal industries received inputs and to which
it sent outputs using data drawn from the 1982 Benchmark Input-Output
Accounts of the United States. The Spearman rank-order correlation for
the six industries using the I/B/E/S-based measure and this third proxy
was 0.67 and was in the hypothesized direction. Given the small sample,
significance tests were not appropriate in any of the three cases. The
proxy measures suggest that our measure of industry information-pro-
cessing load has validity.
Controls
The research design employed two levels of controls. The first was an
industry-level variable, since it is possible that joint ventures are either not
equally valuable in all industries or that the life cycle of an industry in-
fluences the rate of formation of joint ventures. From among the life cy-
cle categories used by Auster (1992), we chose maturing-declining indus-
tries, a group in which joint ventures are of less value, according to Auster
(1992: 782-783). If that conjecture is correct, our cboice of a sample from
maturing and declining industries should have led to a conservative test
of our hypothesis. There were no reasons to believe that tlie industries sam-
pled differed substantially from each other in terms of the inherent value
of joint ventures or their patterns of formation. All six industries have been
described as declining or matiu-ing over the last decade (e.g., Auster, 1992;
Harrigan, 1988b).
A second control was for firm size, since research (e.g., Koh & Venka-
traman, 1991) has found that smaller partners exhihit larger abnormal re-
turns than their larger counterparts.
Data
Koh and Venkatraman (1991) found that different types of alliances
were associated with different levels of investor response, but restricting
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the sample to joint ventures eliminated the influence of alliance type. We
defined joint ventures as arrangements that involved either equity partic-
ipation by the partners in a new entity, one partner's taking an equity po-
sition in the other, or ongoing manufacturing activity, marketing activity,
or both, between partners (cf. Harrigan. 1985). Thus, such arrangements
as R&D partnerships, cross-licensing, and pure franchising were screened
out.
The announcement dates and descriptions of the joint ventures in the
sample industries were obtained from the Wall Street Journal index and
Mergers &• Acquisitions for the years 1978-91. We screened the an-
nouncements to ensure that (1) no two events occurred during the an-
nouncement period. (2) there were no announcements of joint ventures
during the estimation period, and (3) there were no other major an-
nouncements during the event period. The final sample consisted of 108
joint ventures, with 36 in the industries with light information-process-
ing loads, 36 in moderate information-processing-load industries, and 36
in heavy-information-processing-load industries. The mean sales of sam-
pled firms was $1.6077 billion (s.d. - $2.1334 billion); the sales figures
ranged from $0,277 billion to $9.2542 billion (in constant 1983-84 dollars).
Forty-one ventures involved the creation of a new entity. 11 involved the
taking of an equity position hy one partner in the other. 60 involved on-
going production and marketing, and 37 involved ongoing marketing and
service provision (the categories are not mutually exclusive). An example
of a production joint venture in the steel industry (heavy information-pro-
cessing load) is one between Nucor and Oregon Steel Mills in which they
built a $400 million minimill to make sheet steel in the Pacific Northwest,
A marketing-related example from the retail industry (light information-
processing load) is Walmart's agreement to join forces with Cullum Com-
pany to build large combination grocery and general merchandise stores.
An example of the formation of a new entity in the computer industry
(moderate information-processing load) is NCR and Teradata corporations'
formation of a joint venture to make parallel processor computers.
Daily returns data were obtained from the Center for Research in Se-
curity Prices (CRSP) database.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the results of tests of significance between the estimated
abnormal returns associated with joint ventures in the light, moderate, and
heavy information-processing-load industries. Since we had hypothesized
that the ahnormal returns in industries with light and heavy information-
processing loads would be more positive than those in industries with
moderate information-processing loads, we compared returns for hoth the
low and high groups with those for the middle group. We compared re-
turns hy calculating the difference between them and testing it for signif-
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icance. Davidson and Worrell (1992) used this method to test for differ-
ences between the market value impacts of different types of automobile
industry product recalls. We used Wilcoxon signed rank test, a nonpara-
metric test for differences between samples (Bruning & Kintz, 1987), to test
for significant differences in abnormal returns; each time period was treat-
ed as an observation from a sample and results compared across infor-
mation-processing-load groups. Results indicate a significant difference
[p < .005) between the returns for the light and moderate information-pro-
cessing-load industries. Similarly, there is a significant difference
(p <.O25) between the returns for the industries with heavy and moder-
ate information-processing loads. The results thus support our industry ef-
fects hypothesis.
Figure 1 presents the results graphically. Since the hypothesis was that
abnormal returns for industries with light and heavy information-pro-
cessing loads would he more positive than those for moderate information-
processing-load industries, we expected a U-shaped curve on plotting ab-
normal returns against industry information-processing load. As Figure 1
shows, this expectation was confirmed.
Additional post hoc tests further reinforced our conclusion. We com-
bined the low and high information-processing subsamples and tested for
the difference from tbe medium subsample. The Wilcoxon signed rank test
showed that the difference was significant (p < .005). Although we hy-
pothesized no difference between tbe low and high subsamples, we test-
ed for such a difference, finding that it was not significant. This result con-
firms our expectation that investors respond similarly in light and heavy
information-processing-load industries.
Three separate analyses were undertaken to examine the possible ef-
fect of firm size. First, we tested the effect of absolute size hy dividing each
industry subsample into large and small groups using median sales (in
1983-84 dollars) to set cutoffs and then combining the small and large
groups into overall groups comprising half the sample. The Wilcoxon
signed rank test revealed no significant difference between the abnormal
returns of the small and large groups. Second, within each industry in-
formation-processing-load group, we again split the sample into small
and large groups on the basis of median sales. We then compared the ab-
normal returns for each subgroup and found that they conformed to the
U-shaped pattern shown by the combined sample in Figure 1. Third, since
it has been found that the smaller of two partners enjoys a more positive
market reaction than the larger partner in a joint venture (e.g., McConnell
& Nantell, 1985), we examined tbe sample to determine the sizes of the
partners. In constructing our sample, we included the returns only of the
first-named partner in each joint venture, which is an appropriate sampling
technique for event study research (e.g., McConnell & Nantell, 19B5).
However, we compiled size data on both partners, allowing us to determine
their relative sizes. In six cases, the partner in our sample was the small-
er partner. We recalculated the analysis without the six small partners and
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found no significant differences from the original analysis. Thus, the size
effect does not appear to be a potential confounding factor.
An additional analysis was conducted to test for the effects of the de-
gree of product-market relatedness of the joint ventures. We used a pro-
cedure similar to that of Kob and Venkatraman (1991) to classify eacb joint
venture as either related or unrelated in product-markets and technologies.
The results indicated that 104 of tbe 108 joint ventures were related to core
products, markets, or technologies of the parent firm. Three ventures were
unrelated, and one remained unclassified as a result of data limitations.
Thus, the sample was homogeneous in terms of the degree of relatedness.
As a check on the original results, we recalculated tbe event study analy-
sis excluding the four unrelated and unclassified ventures and found no
differences.
To address any concern about the representativeness of our sample,
we analyzed tbe abnormal returns in the sample as a whole. The results
indicated that joint venture announcements in all six industries in tbe sam-
ple were associated witb significant abnormal returns. Our analysis
showed that the average prediction error over the two-day announcement
period (representing the gain in market value attributable to the an-
nouncements of tbe joint ventures) was 0.395 percent and that the null hy-
pothesis that an announcement had no effect could be rejected at the .1
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level of significance. In general, the market reaction was significant at the
.05 level for the periods day -2 to day 1 and day - 1 to day 1. and at the
.1 level for the periods day -2 to day 2, day - 2 to day 0, and day - 1 to
day 0. In view of the conclusions of previous research, these results con-
firm that our sample was representative of joint venture announcements
in general.
DISCUSSION
We predicted that in industries with moderate information-process-
ing loads the market value impact of announcements of joint ventures will
be lower than it will he in indnstries with either light or heavy informa-
tion-processing loads, therehy highlighting the role of cognitive factors in
how investors evaluate joint venture announcements. Our results point to
the conclusion that the information-processing load associated with an in-
dustry has an effect on investor response to joint venture announcements
and should he considered in future event studies.
Before we turn to how market signaling can he used to address in-
formation-processing-load issues, we note three limitations of this re-
searcb and directions for future study. A basic assumption of this study
is that analysts understand the firms they monitor. However, an alterna-
tive hypothesis is that the value of a joint venture may he difficult to as-
sess if it is designed to enhance or combine capabilities or routines whose
synergistic effects are not easily understood hy analysts (Harrison, Hitt,
Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991). A second limitation is the possihility that in-
formation-processing loads vary across strategic groups within an indus-
try. A final limitation regards the sample's being confined to mature and
declining industries and whether results would generalize to emerging and
growth industries. Although these limitations are valid and warrant future
study, managers who adopt a signaling perspective on joint venture an-
nouncements may he able to address the associated concerns.
Joint Venture Announcements as Signaling
There is a developing body of literature on signals, defined as "an-
nouncements. . . intended to convey information" (Heil & Robertson,
1991), in the fields of economics (e.g., Spence, 1974), finance (e.g., Bren-
nan & Kraus, 1987), and strategy (e.g.. Heil & Rohertson. 1991]. The view
that joint venture announcements are signals to investors is implicit in the
event study method. However, few researchers have applied the idea of sig-
naling to the study of the market value inapact of announcements. We sug-
gest that this would he a fruitful direction for research.
The major benefit stemming from applying a signaling perspective to
joint ventures would he a richer understanding of the process of investor
reaction to market events. Crucial to this process, of course, are the cog-
nitive attributes and limitations of individual investors, which have hith-
erto not been part of the market value impact framework. Announcing a
joint venture allows managers to both convey information to the invest-
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ment community and receive feedback from analysts as to the value they
place on the joint venture. However, if the signaling hetween managers and
analysts is not clear as a result of prohlems at either end, tbe possibility
of useful feedback is reduced. We contend that as the information-pro-
cessing load increases, so does the possibility that the intent of a joint ven-
ture is not immediately clear. Current event study research has not gone
beyond investigating the hroad association between specific events and in-
vestor response, perhaps because of methodological constraints. Taking a
signaling approach based on what is known ahout human cognitive
processes and limitations would force research attention onto moderating
variables such as sender, signal, and receiver characteristics and firm, mar-
ket, and industry characteristics (Heil & Rohertsoii, 1991).
Studies by Higgins and Bannister (1992) and Higgins and Diffenhach
(1989) have underscored the importance of communicating strategy to
stockholders. This research suggests that corporations' communication of
strategy to the financial community affects share prices. A survey showed
that a growing number of firms devote a significant portion of their cor-
porate advertising hudgets to communicating corporate strategy (Higgins
& Diffenbach, 1989). Respondents to the same survey also noted that strat-
egy messages and communication media must be tailored to specific tar-
get audiences. In addition, the current research has shown that firms need
to take industry information-processing loads into account when com-
municating strategy to the financial community.
Viewed in this light, our results suggest that joint venture announce-
ments do not have the same signaling characteristics in all industries. Man-
agers in industries associated with moderate and heavy information-pro-
cessing loads may need to take extra precautions if they want their audi-
ences to fully appreciate the impact of announced events. In an industry
with a moderate information-processing load, for instance, they may need
to spell out in greater detail the potential benefits of the proposed actions,
to assist investors in their task of sensitivity analysis. When the informa-
tion-processing load in an industry is heavy, they may need to specifical-
ly address the heuristics that investors may use. Generally, the content of
communication may need to include details that help investors to deal
with the information-processing load associated with the relevant indus-
try. Thus, we conclude that incorporating a cognitive perspective and ap-
plying a signaling framework to the event study literature leads to novel
insights into the processes by which investors respond to corporate an-
nouncements.
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